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Abstract. We propose a market-based information aggregation mechanism to 
manage the supply side uncertainty in the supply chain. In our analytical model, 
a simple supply chain consists of a group of retailers who order a homogeneous 
product from two suppliers. The two suppliers differ in their ability to fulfill 
orders – one always delivers orders and the other fulfills orders 
probabilistically. We model the supply chain decisions as a Stackelberg game 
where the supplier who has uncertain reliability decides a wholesale price 
before the retailers who independently receive signals about the supplier’s 
reliability determine their sourcing strategies. We then propose an information 
market to trade binary contracts with payoffs contingent on the supplier’s true 
reliability. Using a simple uniform demand distribution, we demonstrate that the 
market-based information aggregation mechanism improves the overall supply 
chain efficiency.  
Keywords: Information market, Supply chain, Uncertainty, Game theory. 
1   Introduction 
Information market, also known as prediction market, is a powerful information 
acquisition mechanism to elicit and aggregate information from a variety of sources. 
For years, public prediction markets have been used for politics (Iowa Electronic 
Market), video game (simExchange) or movie box-office (Hollywood Stock 
Exchange) sales. Prediction markets focusing on economic statistics such as 
employment rates, retail sales, industrial production, and private sector returns have 
been launched by Goldman Sachs, Deutsche Bank, and the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange. Economic Derivatives and Hedgestreet are two prediction markets that 
offer trading of innovative futures contracts. 
In addition to predicting public events and macroeconomic indicators, many 
leading companies have experimented with internal prediction markets to forecast 
corporate events. For example, Google has designed quite a few internal markets to 
provide estimates by collecting intelligence from the wisdom of employees. These 
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markets are designed to forecast both demand for its own products, such as Gmail, as 
well as the performance of competitive products, such as the Apple iPhone. It is also 
well known that Hewlett Packard (HP) is among the first businesses to strategically 
deploy prediction markets. McAdams and Malone [7] proposed an internal futures 
market to allow plant managers learn information about which products are most 
profitable from sales people. Usually predictions about possible future events can be 
designed as tradable contracts whose payoffs depend on the future realization of 
certain events. Prices of these contracts can be interpreted as a market-generated 
forecast of uncertain future events. 
Guo et al. [4] extend the internal, corporate use of prediction market to an external, 
supply chain environment. They propose a macro prediction market to manage the 
systematic demand risk in a supply chain. Fang et al. [3] discussed alternative market 
mechanisms to separate the information flow from the physical product flow in 
supply chain optimization. They demonstrate the potential of using properly designed 
market mechanisms to yield accurate demand forecasts among supply chain partners. 
They suggest that market mechanisms outperform other traditional methods of 
demand forecasting in several aspects. When being asked to back up predictions with 
real money, the performance-dependent reward mechanism well aligns supply chain 
partners’ incentives to share useful information with the goal of improving overall 
forecast accuracy. Additionally, market mechanisms aggregate useful demand-related 
information from both within and outside the supply chain. The ability to crowd-
sourcing the forecast information contributes to improved forecast accuracy and better 
business planning. 
Though promising, the integration of prediction market with supply chain 
optimization and business decision making is still in an early stage. Prior work has 
demonstrated the usefulness of prediction market in supply chain demand forecasting. 
In this paper, we try to extend the scope of supply chain applications to manage 
supply side uncertainty. For example, a retailer may run a prediction market in its 
procurement team about the future delivery of a key component. If the same market 
can be opened to other retailers who are interested in knowing the reliability of the 
component supplier, the collective forecasting outcome in the large supply network 
could outperform that in the internal market. 
Supply side uncertainty is a well recognized problem in the supply chain literature 
[1]. It is quite common in the semiconductor industry that the production process has 
yield variations. With random yield, firms often receive a random portion of the order 
placed with a supplier. In other cases, supply uncertainty is binary in nature. An order 
placed with a supplier either arrives in full or not at all. Natural disasters and 
equipment failures are common reasons to cause such supply disruption. To better 
manage uncertain yield, firms usually source from two or more suppliers. Operational 
issues of quantity allocation between competing suppliers and its effects on the 
inventory policies have practical significance. Additionally, supply chain partners 
have asymmetric information about the supplier’s reliability. Yang et al. [10] adopts a 
mechanism design approach to characterize the optimal menu of contracts. Tomlin [8] 
studies sourcing strategies when a firm can update its forecast of a supplier’s yield 
distribution. A central question addressed in the literature is how uncertainty about a 
supplier’s reliability influences a firm’s optimal sourcing and inventory decisions. In  
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general, it is shown that reducing such uncertainty can improve supply chain 
efficiency.  
This study aims to explore the potential of using an information market mechanism 
to crowd-source a supplier’s reliability forecast in a supply chain setting. The paper is 
organized as follows. We present a simple supply chain game theoretical model in 
Section 2. The supply chain information structure and our information market 
mechanism design are discussed in Section 3. Using a simple example based on 
uniform demand distribution in Section 4, we demonstrate the benefit of market-based 
information aggregation in improving the overall supply chain profit. We conclude 
our paper with future research directions in Section 5. 
2   The Base Model 
In this section, we consider a stylized model in which a retailer determines a sourcing 
strategy from two potential suppliers to satisfy an uncertain market demand. We 
investigate how the supplier’s reliability uncertainty and pricing decision influence 
the sourcing strategy used by the retailer to mitigate the supply risk. In the next 
section, we extend our model to a supply network of N  retailers.  
We assume that the two suppliers differ in their ability to fulfill orders. Supplier 1 
guarantees delivery of orders from the retailer so she is always reliable. Supplier 2 
delivers orders with probability θ . We interpret θ  as the reliability measure of 
supplier 2. In case that supplier 2 fails to deliver, she pays the retailer a non-delivery 
penalty cost (compensation cost) c  per unit. To simplify our analysis, we assume 
supplier 1’s wholesale price v  is exogenously given. We model the supply chain as a 
Stackelberg game where supplier 2 determines a wholesale price w , and the retailer 
decides the order quantity pair (Q ,q ), where Q  and q  represent the retailer’s order 
quantities from supplier 2 and supplier 1, respectively. Moreover, the retailer only 
pays supplier 2 for the quantity that she actually delivers. 
The retailer sells the product at an exogenous retail price r . We assume the market 
demand is random with density ( )f x  and cumulative distribution function ( )F x  on 
the interval [ ],x x . Demand not filled in a period is lost. Suppose the lost sales cost is 
h  per unit. Inventory left over at the end of the period is salvaged at the value of g  
per unit. We further assume supplier 2’s unit production cost is sc  regardless of 
whether it is successful or not. Without loss of generality, we assume sv h c> > , 
v g> , r v> , w h c> ≥ , r w g> > . Note that these conditions do not put 
additional constraints to our model, but are used to avoid discussion of trivial cases. A 
complete list of notations is provided in the Appendix. 
2.1   The Retailer’s Sourcing Strategy 
To mitigate the supply risk, the retailer has to determine her sourcing strategy based 
on her belief about supplier 2’s reliability and announced wholesale price. Denote θ  
as the retailer’s belief about the supplier’s reliability.  It may or may not be the same 
as supplier 2’s true reliability θ , as shown later in Section 3. 
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Define ( )( )11
v r h c
w
θ
θ
− − + −=    and
 
( )1
2
c
w v
θ
θ
−= +  . We have the following results about 
the retailer’s optimal sourcing strategy and order quantities. 
Proposition 1: Given supplier 2’s wholesale price w , the retailer’s sourcing strategy 
can be characterized by:  
1. If 1w w≤ , the retailer single sources from supplier 2 with order quantity 
determined by  
( ) ( )
( )
1* 1 r h w c
r h g
Q F
θ θ
θ
+ − + −−
+ −
⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
  (1) 
2. If 1 2w w w< ≤ , the retailer dual source from both supplies with order quantities 
determined by 
( ) ( )
( )( )
1* 1
1
r h v r h w c
r h g
q F
θ θ
θ
+ − − + − − −−
− + −
⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
  (2) 
( ) ( )
( )
1* 1 *r h w c
r h g
Q F q
θ θ
θ
+ − + −−
+ −
⎡ ⎤= −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
  (3) 
3. If 2w w> , the retailer single sources from supplier 1with order quantity 
determined by  
* 1 r h v
r h gq F
− + −
+ −⎡ ⎤= ⎣ ⎦  (4) 
The following figure illustrates the effect of wholesale price on sourcing strategies 
using a uniform demand distribution with parameter values chosen according to Table 
1 in Section 4. Under other types of demand distribution such as the normal demand 
distribution, the shape may not be piecewise linear. But the qualitative insights remain 
the same. 
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Fig. 1. Effect of Wholesale Price on Sourcing Strategies 
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We see that the retailer’s order quantity from supplier 2 decreases as supplier 2’s 
wholesale price increases. In addition, the total order quantity decreases in supplier 
2’s wholesale price as well. Not surprisingly, when supplier 2’s wholesale price is 
significantly lower than supplier 1’s, the retailer is interested in ordering from 
supplier 2 due to the lower price discount. Note that when w v= , the retailer would 
order more from supplier 1 than that from supplier 2. This is because, all else equal, 
supplier 2 is less reliable than supplier 1 so supplier 1 is more attractive. On the other 
hand, due to the compensation supplier 2 agrees to pay in case of delivery failure, it is 
equivalent that supplier 2 signs an option contract with the retailer. Supplier 2 pays c  
as a premium to elicit order from the retailer. The option contract is exercised at strike 
price w c−  if supplier 2 delivers the order, and the option contract is not exercised if 
supplier 2 fails to deliver the order. This flexible contract attracts the retailer to 
partially order from supplier 2 as a secondary souring channel even under the case 
that supplier 2’s wholesale price is greater than or equal to supplier 1’s.  
2.2   Supplier 2’s Pricing Game 
Given the retailer’s sourcing strategy characterized in Proposition 1, supplier 2’s 
problem is to choose the wholesale price w  to maximize the expected profit. The 
optimization problem can be expressed as: 
( ) ( )[ ]* * , 1 s
w
Max Q w w c c Qπ θ θ= − − −  (5) 
Differentiating the supplier’s objective function, we have 
( ) ( )[ ]* *, * 1 0Q w Qsw wQ w c cπ θ θ θ∂ ∂∂ ∂= + − − − =  (6) 
If the retailer sources solely from supplier 2, then under the condition 1w w≤ , 
differentiating *Q  from (1) we have ( ) ( )
*
*
1Q
w r h g f Q
∂
∂ + −= − . Substituting 
*Q
w
∂
∂  into (6) we 
derive the optimality condition for the supplier’s pricing game under the single-
sourcing strategy.  
If the retailer sources from both suppliers, then under the condition 1 2w w w< ≤ , 
differentiating *Q  from (3) yields ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
*
* * *
1
1
Q
w r h g f q Q r h g f q
θ
θ
∂
∂ + − + − + −= − +

 . Substituting 
*Q
w
∂
∂  into (6) we derive the optimality condition for the supplier’s pricing game under 
single-sourcing. 
We assume that demand distribution has an increasing generalized failure rate 
(IGFR). Lariviere and Porteus [6] showed that if the demand distribution is IGFR 
with a finite mean, the supplier’s problem is pseudo-concave. Therefore, we can 
characterize the equilibrium in the following proposition. 
Proposition 2: Let the pair ( )* *,w Q  be the solution to the following system of 
equations:  
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( )
( ) ( )
*
*
1* 0sw c c
r h g f Q
Q θ θθ − − −+ −− =  (7) 
( ) ( ) ( )( )* 1* r h w cr h gF Q θ θθ+ − + −+ −=    (8) 
If * 1w w≤ , then ( )* *,w Q  constitutes a Stackelberg equilibrium of the inventory 
game in which the retailer chooses a single-sourcing strategy. Otherwise, let the 
triple ( )** ** **, ,w q Q  be the solution to the following system of equations:  
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )** ** **** ** 1 11 0s r h g f q Q r h g f qQ w c c θθθ θ θ + − + − + −⎡ ⎤+ − − − − + =⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦

  (9) 
 
( ) ( )
( )
** 1** 1 **r h w c
r h g
Q F q
θ θ
θ
+ − + −−
+ −
⎡ ⎤= −⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
  (10) 
( ) ( )
( )( )
** 1** 1
1
r h v r h w c
r h g
q F
θ θ
θ
+ − − + − − −−
− + −
⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
  (11) 
If 1 2w w w< ≤ , then the pair ( )** **,w Q  constitutes a Stackelberg equilibrium of the 
inventory game in which the retailer chooses a dual-sourcing strategy. Otherwise, 
supplier 2 prices *** 1w w= , and the retailer is indifferent between the single-
sourcing and dual-sourcing strategies. 
3   The Information Structure 
In this section, we extend our Stackelberg supply chain game to a supply chain 
network of N retailers. We assume the retailers only differ in their ability to observe 
signals about supplier 2’s true reliability. For simplicity, we assume that the true 
reliability θ  is unknown but can take two possible values: Lθ  and Hθ , where 
L Hθ θ< .  
Before ordering, we assume each retailer obtains a signal s  correlated to the 
supplier 2’s reliability θ . We further assume that s  takes two possible values: 0 and 
1. One can consider receiving a signal 1 or 0 as receiving good news or bad news. 
Denote the total number of retailers who receive signal 1s =  is α  and the total 
number of retailers who receive signal 0s =  is β . So Nα β+ = .   
Assume that ( ) ( )1 | 0 | 1/2H LP s P sθ θ θ θ λ= = = = = = > . That is, a 
retailer is more likely to receive a piece of good (bad) news when the true reliability 
Hθ θ=  ( Lθ θ= ). In addition, we assume that the prior belief that ( )HP pθ θ= = . 
In the following, we characterize the belief update under different supply chain 
information structures. 
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3.1   Decentralized Information Framework 
For those retailers who receive 1s = , the posterior belief of θ  will be updated as hθ , 
where: 
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )( )
1 1
1 1
| 1
| 1 H L
p
p pH
p
p ph L
P s
E s
λ
λ λ
λ θ θ
λ λ
θ θ
θ θ θ
+ − −
−
+ − −
= = =
= = + 
 
(12) 
For those retailers who receive 0s = , the posterior belief of θ  will be updated as θA , 
where:   
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )( ) ( )
1
1 1
1
1 1
| 0
| 0 H L
p
p pH
p
p pL
P s
E s
λ
λ λ
λ θ θ
λ λ
θ θ
θ θ θ
−
− + −
− −
− + −
= = =
= = +A 
 
(13) 
Based on the posterior belief jθ , for ,j h= A , the order quantities will have the same 
expression as described in Proposition 1 by simply substituting θwith jθ , depending 
on the received signals. Since we assume two types of signals, for given supplier 2’s 
wholesale price, the order quantities are of two types. Denote *hQ  and
*QA  as the order 
quantities when retailers receive signal 1 and 0, respectively. The total order quantity 
to supplier 2 will be * *hQ Qα β+ A .  Accordingly, the total order quantities to supplier 1 
will be * *hq qα β+ A . 
3.1.1   Effect of Perceived Reliability on Sourcing Strategies  
Based on different signals received, the retailer’s sourcing strategies are described as 
follows. 
Proposition 3: Based on the received signal 1s =   or 0 and the perceived reliability 
(i.e., the corresponding posterior belief jθ , for ,j h= A ), the retailer’s sourcing 
strategies are characterized by: 
1. If w v< , the retailer dual source from both suppliers if jθ θ< , where 
r h c v
r h c wθ + − −+ − −= ; otherwise, the retailer will single source from supplier 2. 
2. If w v> , the retailer dual source from both suppliers  if jθ θ≤ , where 
c
c w vθ + −= ; otherwise, the retailer will single source from supplier 1. 
The following figure illustrates how the sourcing strategy is affected by both the 
perceived reliability and the wholesale price. Again, the figure is plotted based on a 
uniform demand distribution with parameter values chosen according to Table 1 in 
Section 4. 
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Fig. 2. Effect of Perceived Reliability on Sourcing Strategies 
In Figure 2, θ  and θ  represent the threshold levels where the retailer changes her 
sourcing strategy. When supplier 2’s wholesale price is lower than supplier 1’s, 
retailers whose perceived reliability is above the curve would prefer a single-sourcing 
strategy. In this case, retailers prefer lower price, more reliable supplier. In contrast, 
when supplier 2’s wholesale price is higher than supplier 1’s, retailers whose 
perceived reliability is lower than the curve would be interested in ordering from 
supplier 2. This is due to the expected compensation from supplier 2. 
For any given perceived reliability, we can draw a parallel line to cross over the 
threshold curve. We can see that the wholesale price range for dual-sourcing 
decreases as the retailer’s perceived reliability increases. This implies that a dual 
sourcing strategy is more likely used by a retailer if the supply base is more 
differentiated.  
3.1.2   Supplier 2’s Incentive for Information Disclosure  
In order to analyze supplier 2’s incentive for information disclosure, we first 
characterize the effect of the perceived reliability on the retailer’s order quantity. 
Figure 3 illustrates such effect. 
In Figure 3, we denote the wholesale price corresponding to θ  and θ  as w  and 
w  respectively. We further use subscripts H, L, N to denote the scenarios where the 
perceived reliabilities are High ( 1s = ), Low ( 0s = ), or No information (under the 
prior probability). The No information case is equivalent to no information update so 
the prior belief is used to determine order quantity. 
Corresponding to Figures 1 & 2, the kinks occur when the retailer changes from 
single-sourcing to dual-sourcing strategy. We see that, if the retailer single sources 
from supplier 2, then the order quantity decreases in the perceived reliability. If the 
retailer sources from both suppliers, then the order quantity for supplier 2 decreases 
faster when the perceived reliability is high than that when the perceived reliability is 
low as supplier 2’s wholesale price increases. Additionally, when supplier 2’s 
wholesale price is greater than supplier 1’s, the retailer’s order quantity for supplier 2 
decreases in the perceived reliability. 
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Fig. 3. Effect of Perceived Reliability on Order Quantity 
Based on this observation, we can analyze the supplier’s incentive for information 
disclosure as follows. 
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Fig. 4. Supplier 2’s Incentive for Information Disclosure 
From Figure 4, it is clear that a high reliability supplier has no incentive to disclose 
her reliability information most of the time. A high reliability supplier is only willing 
to disclose her reliability information when she decides to price around Hw . In 
contrast, a low reliability supplier has incentive to disclose its reliability information 
most of the time. A low reliability supplier would not disclose its reliability when she 
decides to price around Nw . In general, incentives for information sharing are not 
well aligned in this supply chain game. Supplier 2 cannot credibly signal her type to 
the retailers, and the retailers have no means to better forecast supplier 2’s reliability. 
In the following section, we propose a market-based information aggregation 
mechanism to align retailers’ incentives for information sharing. 
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3.2   Market-Based Collaborative Forecasting 
We propose an information market to elicit and aggregate the retailers’ private 
signals. Presumably the aggregate signals could yield a more reliable forecast of 
supplier 2’s reliability, closer to the true reliability θ . Additionally, the market 
mechanism should provide adequate incentive for the retailers to “tell the truth.” For 
this purpose, we design two binary contracts: the “High_Reliability” contract pays off 
$1 if the future realized reliability is Hθ and $0 if Lθ θ= ; the “Low_Reliability” pays 
off $1 if the future realized reliability is Lθ  and $0 if Hθ θ= . Similar types of binary 
contracts have been used in IEM trading, among others.  
Based on their observed signals, the retailers decide which types of contract to 
trade in the market. According to [9], the equilibrium market prices will efficiently 
aggregate all the initially dispersed information and can be interpreted as the 
probabilities (or market beliefs) about supplier 2’s reliability. Denote such 
equilibrium prices for the contracts “High_Reliability” and “Low_Reliability” as *Hφ  
and *Lφ . We can derive that: 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
1*
1 1 1
1*
1 1 1
| ,
| ,
p
H H p p
p
L L p p
P
P
βα
β αα β
α β
α ββ α
λ λ
λ λ λ λ
λ λ
λ λ λ λ
φ θ θ α β
φ θ θ α β
−
− + − −
−
− + − −
⎧⎪ = =⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪ = =⎪⎪⎩


 (14) 
Therefore, the market-based belief (expected reliability) is expressed as 
( ) * *| ,m H H L LEθ θ α β φ θ φ θ= +   (15) 
which is known to all retailers and supplier 2. Based on the aggregated information, 
the total order quantity is ( )* mNQ θ . One can justify that mθ θ→  when N → ∞ . 
So the market prediction of θ  will be reliable and close to true value when the 
number of market participants is large.  
4   An Illustration with Uniform Demand 
Assume that the uncertain demand is characterized by a uniform distribution. The 
density function is expressed as: 
( )
1/ if 0
0 otherwise
A x A
f x
⎧ ≤ ≤⎪⎪= ⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
 (16) 
So, ( ) xAF x = , for 0 x A≤ ≤ . We can easily verify that supplier 2’s objective 
function is strictly concave. So a unique equilibrium solution exists. In this numerical 
example, we set 100A = . 
We assume that the supplier 2’s reliability is either high or low with equal 
probabilities. So 0.5p = . Since supplier 2 cannot creditably signal her true type 
(high or low), retailers use our market mechanism to aggregate information and form 
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a collaborative forecast of supplier 2’s reliability. We further assume there are 10 
retailers. All parameter values are summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1. Summary of Parameter Values 
Parameter Interpretation Parameter Value 
True probability of supplier 2 0.8
H
θ =  or 0.4
L
θ =  
Number of retailers 10N =  
Demand distribution 100A =  
Unit retail price 1r =  
Unit opportunity cost of lost sales 0.1h =  
Unit salvage cost of overstock 0.15g =  
Unit production cost of supplier 2 0.05sc =  
Unit compensation cost from 
supplier 2 
{ }0.05,0.06,0.07,0.08,0.09,0.1c =  
Supplier 1’s wholesale price { }0.6,0.7,0.8,0.9v =  
Prior probability 0.5p =  
Conditional probability ( ) ( )1 | 0 | 0.75H LP s P sθ θ θ θ λ= = = = = = =  
To demonstrate the benefit of market-based information sharing, we use the 
decentralized supply chain information structure as benchmark. In the decentralized 
supply chain, each retailer independently receives a private signal 1 or 0, which is 
observable by neither the other retailers nor supplier 2. Retailers who receive signals 
valued 1 and 0 would update their beliefs about supplier 2’s reliability as 0.7hθ =  
and 0.5θ =A , respectively. Based on this updated belief, retailers determine their 
order strategies and best response order quantities corresponding to supplier 2’s 
wholesale price. 
Supplier 2 does not have information about the retailers’ signals. However, she 
knows that retailers’ signal distribution follows a binomial distribution, contingent on 
its reliability. The probability mass function with N = 10 and 
( ) ( )1 | 0 |H LP s P sθ θ θ θ λ= = = = = =  can be characterized by the following 
binomial distribution: 
( ) ( )Pr 1 N kkNk kα λ λ −
⎛ ⎞⎟⎜= = −⎟⎜ ⎟⎟⎜⎝ ⎠  (17) 
where 0,1,...,10k = .  According to this probability distribution, supplier 2 can fully 
anticipate the expected retailers’ orders. Supplier 2 then determines a wholesale price 
*dw
 
that maximizes her expected profit. 
Under the market-based information aggregation, the market efficiently aggregates 
all available information and the final equilibrium market prices are observed by both 
the supplier and the retailers. Correspondingly, the market belief mθ is formed and is 
known to all supply chain members. Supplier 2 can fully anticipate the retailers’  
 
 Managing Supply Uncertainty with an Information Market 91 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R
et
ai
le
rs
(A
gg
re
ga
te
d)
S
up
pl
ie
r
2
S
up
pl
ie
r
1
C
ha
in
v
c
T
Q
d
T
Q
m
T
qd
T
qm
P
R
d
P
R
m
w
d
w
m
P
2d
P
2m
P
1d
P
1m
P
C
d
P
C
m
E
ff
.
Im
pr
ov
em
en
t
0.
00
53
0.
00
53
4.
11
0.
00
0.
00
16
3.
34
16
3.
32
0.
60
0
0.
59
3
31
.7
8
32
.5
9
0.
00
0.
00
19
5.
11
19
5.
91
0.
41
%
0.
02
52
8.
20
53
3.
85
0.
00
0.
00
16
3.
44
16
3.
34
0.
61
3
0.
61
0
31
.7
1
32
.5
8
0.
00
0.
00
19
5.
14
19
5.
92
0.
40
%
0.
9
0.
04
52
5.
86
53
3.
56
0.
00
0.
00
16
3.
56
16
3.
36
0.
62
9
0.
62
7
31
.3
7
32
.5
5
0.
00
0.
00
19
4.
93
19
5.
91
0.
50
%
0.
06
52
4.
59
53
3.
25
0.
00
0.
00
16
3.
71
16
3.
39
0.
64
5
0.
64
4
31
.3
0
32
.5
4
0.
00
0.
00
19
5.
01
19
5.
93
0.
47
%
0.
08
52
2.
78
53
2.
98
0.
00
0.
00
16
3.
89
16
3.
43
0.
66
1
0.
66
1
31
.0
6
32
.4
7
0.
00
0.
00
19
4.
95
19
5.
90
0.
49
%
0.
1
52
1.
50
53
2.
60
0.
00
0.
00
16
4.
09
16
3.
47
0.
67
6
0.
67
9
30
.8
8
32
.4
1
0.
00
0.
00
19
4.
97
19
5.
87
0.
46
%
0.
00
61
7.
76
57
1.
73
2.
76
32
.7
7
15
8.
13
15
4.
33
0.
51
1
0.
52
6
58
.0
2
49
.6
6
2.
07
24
.5
8
21
8.
22
22
8.
57
4.
74
%
0.
02
61
8.
98
57
1.
84
1.
32
32
.7
5
15
8.
62
15
4.
35
0.
52
5
0.
54
3
58
.5
3
49
.7
5
0.
99
24
.5
6
21
8.
14
22
8.
67
4.
83
%
0.
8
0.
04
61
9.
55
57
1.
43
0.
00
32
.9
4
15
9.
15
15
4.
37
0.
54
0
0.
56
0
58
.7
3
49
.7
3
0.
00
24
.7
1
21
7.
87
22
8.
81
5.
02
%
0.
06
61
3.
53
57
1.
09
0.
00
33
.1
4
15
9.
63
15
4.
40
0.
56
0
0.
57
7
56
.3
2
49
.7
3
0.
00
24
.8
5
21
5.
95
22
8.
98
6.
04
%
0.
08
60
6.
60
57
0.
93
0.
39
33
.1
9
16
0.
01
15
4.
43
0.
58
1
0.
59
4
53
.8
5
49
.6
9
0.
30
24
.8
9
21
4.
15
22
9.
01
6.
94
%
0.
1
59
6.
90
57
0.
53
1.
97
33
.3
9
16
0.
31
15
4.
47
0.
60
3
0.
61
1
51
.0
5
49
.6
5
1.
48
25
.0
4
21
2.
84
22
9.
16
7.
67
%
0.
00
58
0.
00
54
0.
52
82
.1
1
99
.4
4
13
8.
12
14
2.
63
0.
47
1
0.
49
2
73
.8
6
65
.3
2
53
.3
7
64
.6
4
26
5.
35
27
2.
58
2.
73
%
0.
02
57
7.
54
54
0.
42
82
.2
4
99
.4
7
13
8.
67
14
2.
64
0.
48
8
0.
50
9
73
.8
5
65
.3
2
53
.4
5
64
.6
6
26
5.
98
27
2.
62
2.
50
%
0.
7
0.
04
57
5.
08
54
0.
20
82
.3
7
99
.5
8
13
9.
26
14
2.
66
0.
50
4
0.
52
6
73
.7
7
65
.3
4
53
.5
4
64
.7
3
26
6.
56
27
2.
73
2.
31
%
0.
06
57
1.
69
53
9.
60
82
.8
9
99
.9
2
13
9.
89
14
2.
68
0.
52
1
0.
54
3
73
.5
0
65
.3
4
53
.8
8
64
.9
5
26
7.
27
27
2.
97
2.
13
%
0.
08
56
8.
57
53
8.
94
83
.1
6
10
0.
27
14
0.
56
14
2.
71
0.
53
8
0.
56
0
73
.0
1
65
.2
8
54
.0
5
65
.1
8
26
7.
63
27
3.
17
2.
07
%
0.
1
56
6.
11
53
7.
97
83
.2
9
10
0.
78
14
1.
28
14
2.
75
0.
55
5
0.
57
8
72
.6
9
65
.2
1
54
.1
4
65
.5
1
26
8.
11
27
3.
47
2.
00
%
0.
00
60
0.
70
55
2.
19
15
0.
88
17
3.
40
11
4.
88
12
6.
06
0.
38
6
0.
41
1
12
1.
75
11
1.
10
82
.9
8
95
.3
7
31
9.
62
33
2.
52
4.
04
%
0.
02
61
3.
98
55
1.
65
14
4.
21
17
3.
71
11
5.
26
12
6.
08
0.
39
4
0.
42
8
12
3.
29
11
1.
19
79
.3
2
95
.5
4
31
7.
86
33
2.
81
4.
70
%
0.
6
0.
04
61
9.
02
55
0.
95
14
2.
11
17
4.
10
11
5.
51
12
6.
11
0.
40
6
0.
44
5
12
4.
31
11
1.
23
78
.1
6
95
.7
5
31
7.
98
33
3.
09
4.
75
%
0.
06
61
3.
84
55
0.
38
14
6.
01
17
4.
37
11
5.
75
12
6.
17
0.
42
1
0.
46
2
12
5.
17
11
1.
25
80
.3
0
95
.9
1
32
1.
23
33
3.
32
3.
76
%
0.
08
60
7.
87
55
0.
15
15
0.
18
17
4.
55
11
6.
13
12
6.
22
0.
43
7
0.
47
9
12
5.
55
11
1.
32
82
.6
0
96
.0
0
32
4.
27
33
3.
54
2.
86
%
0.
1
60
2.
56
54
9.
38
15
4.
21
17
4.
92
11
6.
47
12
6.
30
0.
45
3
0.
49
7
12
6.
02
11
1.
27
84
.8
2
96
.2
1
32
7.
31
33
3.
78
1.
98
%
Ta
bl
e 
2.
 
Su
pp
ly
 
Ch
ai
n
 P
ro
fit
s 
u
n
de
r 
M
ar
ke
t-
B
as
ed
 
(M
) a
n
d 
D
ec
en
tra
liz
ed
 
(D
) I
nfo
ra
m
tio
n
 
St
ru
ct
u
re
 
92 Z. Guo, F. Fang, and A.B. Whinston 
orders based on mθ . Supplier 2 then determines a wholesale price *mw
 
that 
maximizes her expected profit. This optimal wholesale price  *mw can be adjusted 
according to the actual number of retailers who receives high/low signals.  
Table 2 reports expected values of the supply chain game outcome under both the 
decentralized and market-based information structure. We use superscript d and m to 
denote the decentralized, no information sharing case and the market-based, 
collaborative forecasting case side by side. We report the wholesale price w and the 
expected aggregated order quantities TQ and Tq from all the retailers to supplier 1 
and supplier 2, respectively. We also present supplier 1, supplier 2, and retailers’ 
expected profits, as well as the total supply chain profit (denoted as PS1, PS2, and 
PC). We then perform sensitivity analysis based on two key parameters: the 
compensation c and supplier 1’s wholesale price v . 
We see that, under all cases, the expected supply chain efficiency increases under 
the market-based collaborative forecasting framework in comparison with the 
decentralized framework. The last column in Table 2 presents the percentage 
improvement of the total supply chain profit. We measure the total supply chain profit 
as the sum of profits from all supply chain members including all retailers, supplier 1 
and supplier 2. We measure the supply chain efficiency improvement as the ratio of 
the supply chain profit difference between the market-based framework and the 
decentralized framework to the decentralized supply chain profit, i.e., (PCm-PCd)/PCd.   
We further observe that the degree of supply chain efficiency improvement varies 
when v  and c changes. Interestingly, the improvement is the highest when v  values 
around 0.8. At this value, supplier 2 manipulates the wholesale price in the 
decentralized framework so that all the retailers single source from her in most of the 
cases. However, in the market-based framework, the market information aggregation 
helps reveal supplier 2’s true type to all the retailers so it greatly reduce the room for 
supplier 2 to manipulate the market. As a result, the retailers choose to dual source 
from both suppliers in most of the cases. Since supplier 2’s reliability is either 0.8 or 
0.4 with equal probability, from the supply chain perspective, it is more beneficial if 
retailers order from the perfectly reliable supplier 1. This is because all price related 
parameters such as the wholesale price and compensation cost only affect the division 
of profit among supply chain members rather than the total supply chain profit. 
Sourcing from the more reliable supplier 1 can eliminate the supply chain inefficiency 
caused by lost sales opportunity due to the less reliable supplier’s inability to fulfill 
orders. In the case that v = 0.8, we observe significantly higher order quantity  
(Tqm –Tqd) from supplier 1. Hence the supply chain efficiency improves the most.  
Another interesting observation is that increasing the compensation value c may or 
may not improve the degree of supply chain efficiency. When v is relatively high (e.g. 
v =0.8 or 0.9), the degree of improvement increases as c increases. However, when v  
is relatively low (e.g. v =0.6), the degree of improvement moves towards the other 
direction. This result is not too surprising. Even though supplier 2 agrees a fixed 
compensation to retailers in the case of non-delivery, she can adjust the wholesale 
price to incorporate the effect of compensation on her profitability. Hence an increase 
of compensation may not always make supplier 2 more attractive, but depend on how 
supplier 2 is actually adjusting the wholesale price. This intuition is confirmed with the 
observation that the higher compensation, the higher the average wholesale price. 
When v  is relatively high, supplier 1 is less competitive in comparison with supplier 
 Managing Supply Uncertainty with an Information Market 93 
2. So supplier 2 can offer a relatively high compensation but effectively adjust the 
wholesale price upwards and still attract retailers to single source from her. As a result, 
supplier 2’s profits increase and retailers’ profits decrease as c increases (as seen when 
v = 0.9). On the other hand, when v  is relatively low, supplier 1 becomes very 
competitive in comparison with supplier 2. Supplier 2 cannot increase the wholesale 
price aggressively when the compensation is high. Although supplier 2 would not 
worse off when she offers higher compensation, retailers benefit from the competition 
between the two suppliers and their profits increase (as seen when v = 0.6).  
5   Concluding Remarks 
An extensive body of work in the literature has shown that information market is a 
promising mechanism to effectively predict uncertain outcomes [2, 9]. However, 
existing applications of such markets have been limited to predict public events such 
as presidential election or internal corporate use such as the prediction of future sales. 
We aim to explore the potential application of information markets in a broader 
decision making environment including the management of supply side uncertainty in 
the supply chain.  
In this paper, we demonstrate the benefit of a market-based information 
aggregation mechanism in improving the overall supply chain efficiency. We choose 
the uniform demand distribution as a simple illustration. In fact, similar qualitative 
insights can be extended to other demand distributions. In addition to fully analyze 
the game structure in equilibrium analysis, future work should formally characterize 
conditions under which the information market improves supply chain performance.  
To better coordinate the supply chain and manage the supply-side uncertainty, we 
assume a compensation scheme is offered by supplier 2 as a form of risk sharing 
contract. However, we assume the unit compensation is predetermined and the 
supplier only needs to decide the wholesale price. Other forms of coordination 
contracts, including the options contract, could be studied in future work. Please refer 
to [5] for more general discussion on the distribution function and the coordination 
mechanisms. 
Although we propose to trade simple binary contracts in this research, we expect 
more sophisticated trading contracts such as those with continuous payoffs could also 
be considered in future market mechanism design. Moreover, dynamic models might 
be an alternative modeling tool to study repeated interactions and market dynamics in 
multi-period supply chain coordination. We leave all these interesting explorations to 
future research. 
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Appendix 
Table 3. Table of Notations 
Uncertainty  
θ  Supplier 2’s true reliability, Hθ θ=  or Lθ  
θ  The retailer’s belief about supplier 2’s reliability 
[ ],x x x∈  Random demand with lower bound x  and upper 
bound x  
( )f x  Probability density function of demand 
( )F x  Cumulative density function of demand 
Supply Chain Parameters  
1,...i N=  N retailers 
v  Unit wholesale price charged by supplier 1 
w  Unit wholesale price charged by supplier 2 
q  The retailer’s order from supplier 1 
Q  The retailer’s order from supplier 2 
c  Supplier 2’s unit compensation cost in case of non-
delivery 
sc  Supplier 2’s unit production cost 
r  The retailer’s unit retail price 
h  Unit lost sales cost 
g  Unit salvage value 
Information Structure  
D Denote decentralized information structure 
M Denote market-based information structure 
( )HP pθ θ= =  Prior belief that supplier 2’s reliability is high 
( ) 1LP pθ θ= = −  Prior belief that supplier 2’s reliability is low 
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Table 3. (continued) 
 
{ }1,0s =  The value of binary signal 
α  Number of retailers who receive 1s =  
β  Number of retailers who receive 0s = , 
Nα β+ =  
( )1 | HP s θ θ λ= = =  Conditional probability, ( )0 | 1HP s θ θ λ= = = − , 1/2λ >  
( )0 | LP s θ θ λ= = =  Conditional probability, ( )1 | 1LP s θ θ λ= = = − , 1/2λ >  
hθ ( θA ) The retailer’s perceived reliability if she receives 
signal 1s =  ( 0s = ) 
mθ  Updated market belief based on market prices 
*
Hφ ( *Lφ ) Equilibrium market prices for contracts 
“High_Reliability” ( “Low_Reliability”) 
Threshold Values  
1w  Wholesale price threshold value below which the 
retailer single-sourcing from supplier 2  
2w  Wholesale price threshold value above which the 
retailer single-sourcing from supplier 1  
θ  Reliability threshold value above which the retailer 
single-sourcing from supplier 2 
θ  Reliability threshold value above which the retailer 
single-sourcing from supplier 1 
w  Wholesale price threshold value corresponding to θ  
w  Wholesale price threshold value corresponding to θ  
 
